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Abstract: This article examines the emergence of transnational public spheres 
brought about by women activists in diasporas and countries of origin across 
Europe and the Middle East. Such activism can take various forms – networks, 
partnerships, transnational mobilisations against war or for advocacy – which, in 
turn, have an impact on the ability to provide women with new paths to emancipa-
tion. Although globalising states and societies are becoming more interconnected, 
demarcating inequalities and forms of governance still exist. Parameters based on 
territoriality and national citizenship reinforce the unequal access to resources 
that women experience around the globe and thus have a hand in shaping wom-
en’s agendas. The article concludes that although women may be able to acquire 
empowering tools through feminist transnational networks, these tools are not 
always capable of dismantling boundaries or weakening old hierarchies.
Keywords: diaspora, Europe, feminism, globalisation, Middle East, partnerships, 
transnational networks
Introduction
Out of a total European population of over 830 million, 10 million origi-
nate from the Middle East and North Africa. Europe represents the single 
most popular destination of ‘first generation’ migrants from North African 
and Middle Eastern countries, being home to almost half of all emigrants 
from that area. Of course, migration from the Middle East to Europe can-
not be seen as homogeneous. Palestinian and Iraqi refugees in Sweden 
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and the U.K., Moroccan post-colonial economic migrants in France and 
Italy, Syrian Christians and Coptic Egyptians in the U.K., and Turkish guest 
workers in Germany, just to mention a few, give a sense of the variety of 
identities, histories and reasons for migrating. This heterogeneity hints at 
the different ways in which the migratory flows have occurred. What these 
manifold types of mobile populations have in common, however, is that 
rather than simply assimilating into their countries of residence or birth, 
Middle Eastern and North African diasporas in Europe are increasingly 
articulating their lives through transnational social, cultural, religious and 
political spheres. They are in fact likely to maintain cultural, political and 
symbolic ties and attachments that are far from disappearing, even among 
the younger generations, who often display multiple loyalties and identities. 
In other words, they represent a lived manifestation of the inadequacy of 
nationally and territorially bounded conceptions of membership, political 
mobilisation and sovereignty. Women’s and feminists’ organisations are play-
ing a prominent role in progressively developing agendas aimed at addressing 
the global and transnational dimensions both of their loyalties and political 
beliefs and of the forms of oppression to which they are subjected. 
This article critically explores the emergence of transnational public spheres 
engendered by diasporic women activists and feminists across the Middle 
East and Europe. Examining Kurdish, North African and Iranian transna-
tional activism, the analysis points to the various forms that such activism 
can take (cross-border networks, partnerships, mobilisations against war or 
for advocacy) and discusses their potential to provide women with new paths 
to emancipation from diverse, deterritorialised and yet interlocked layers of 
oppression. While acknowledging that transnational public spheres and thick 
networking across borders have enormous political and theoretical potential, 
particularly in so far as they question classic modernist notions about mem-
bership, loyalties and citizenship from a gender perspective, this article, how-
ever, adopts a cautious attitude and contends that while women can acquire 
empowering tools, they are not always able to dismantle boundaries or weaken 
old hierarchies.
In today’s globalised world of interconnected states and societies we are 
witnessing the emergence of ‘overlapping communities of fate’ (Held 2003: 
470), which are best exemplified by diasporic women’s identities and polit-
ical sensibilities and by transnational forms of collective mobilisation. Yet 
this process is not coupled by the withering away of previous demarcating 
asymmetries and forms of governance. Boundaries based on modern forms of 
membership, such as national citizenship and territoriality, albeit continuously 
shifting, clearly shape women’s agendas and underpin the unequal access to 
resources that women experience around the globe. Cross-borders sensibilities 
and political agendas may emerge, while at the same time new hierarchies may 
come into existence. Moreover, transnational civil societies or public spheres 
can be both empowered and shattered by liberalism and globalisation.
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Notes on Globalisation and Transnational Networks of Resistance
The striking and shared feature of most societies today is that they are char-
acterised by a ‘post-national constellation’ (Fraser 2008). This is exemplified 
by the continuous back and forth movements of diasporas from the society of 
origin to the society of destination and beyond, whether by way of recurrent 
physical return or through symbolic cultural, social and/or political ties and 
loyalties. Even more central in the understanding of contemporary diasporas’ 
lived experiences is the notion of ‘simultaneity’, which sheds light on how 
migrants, refugees and displaced populations simultaneously engage with and 
challenge the nation-building processes of two or more countries or com-
munities (Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2004). Global economic restructuring and 
neo-liberal agendas are part and parcel of this scenario. They contribute to the 
deterritorialisation of communication, information, flows and economies, but 
they also create more insecurity and flexibility for all, leading to the emergence 
of new border regimes (Ong 1999).
The emergence of transnational civil societies and public spheres, promoted 
by diasporas, global forums and international activists around the world, is an 
outcome of globalisation, and yet, at the same time, it underpins the denation-
alisation of politics and of sovereignty. Indeed, as Held (2003) suggests, global 
and transnational political mobilisation is challenging the basic assumptions 
that underlie modern notions of political action. At a spatial level, it blurs the 
boundaries between domestic and foreign spheres and between the territo-
rial and the non-territorial dimension of collective mobilisation. Moreover, 
through new technologies of information, local collective action can have 
immediate impact globally or in other distant areas.
These developments pose new challenges to the nature and forms of collec-
tive political mobilisation, the public sphere and models of governance (Held 
2003). Indeed, under conditions of globalisation and transnationality, in a con-
text where communication, political communities and sovereignty are no longer 
confined or confinable within the borders of the national state, the constitu-
tive elements of the national formulation of the public sphere are shown to be 
inadequate. Nancy Fraser (2008: 89) also argues that the Westphalian nature 
of public sphere theory and practice is being challenged by the fact that people 
increasingly hold multiple nationalities and loyalties and that individuals and 
communities inhabit social, political and cultural spaces across borders. The 
denationalisation and deterritorialisation of political action run parallel with the 
emergence of new cosmopolitan principles defined as ‘the ethical and political 
space which sets out the terms of reference for the recognition of people’s equal 
moral worth’ (Held 2003: 473; see also Appiah 2006). Meanwhile, cosmopolitan 
forms of governance and institution building are invoked as tools that are needed 
to tackle the overlapping communities that are emerging across the globe.
Engaging in cross-border networking, feminists in the South and North have 
been taking an active part in the development of transnational civil societies 
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(Al-Ali and Pratt 2009; Cockburn 2003; Dominguez 2002; Moghadam 2005; 
Shapiro 2005). Neo-liberal agendas and global economic restructuring policies 
can be viewed as partly responsible for both the gendered and the transna-
tional dimensions assumed by contemporary forms of collective mobilisation. 
The 1990s saw the emergence of a new alliance between women of the South 
and the North – or at least of a new shared agenda (Moghadam 2005). Neo-lib-
eral economic policies and the decline of the welfare state in developed coun-
tries affected women in specific ways, pushing feminists to reorganise their 
demands around economic policies, welfare, development and recognition 
(Fraser 2008; Moghadam 2005). On the other side of the globe, the increasing 
participation of women in the labour force paved the way for the rise of a more 
demarcated feminist consciousness among women, leading to the elaboration 
of a more clear-cut gendered agenda (Moghadam 2005).
Transnational feminist mobilisation is also being forged by the increasing 
awareness among feminists that both the nature and the sources of their eco-
nomic and legal oppression and discrimination and the ‘governance structure of 
the global economy’ (Fraser 2008: 113) have assumed a transborder dimension 
that needs to be addressed through what I would call ‘transnational networks of 
resistance’. For example, in analysing the transnational mobilisation of women 
workers between South America and North America, Edmé Dominguez (2002: 
217) notes how ‘transnational networks among women’s organizations are mod-
elling new forms of resistance to the processes of global restructuring’.
Similarly, Middle Eastern women residing in the diaspora, along with 
global feminists and activists located in the Middle East and Europe, have 
been very actively involved over the last decade in promoting international 
campaigns, engaging in advocacy work targeting international organisations 
and fund-raising for various activities and conferences (Moghadam 2005). 
The creation of gendered transnational networks is often tied to a twofold 
agenda: the development of new political subjectivities advocating for change 
and reforms and, simultaneously, the assertion of the cross-border nature 
of women’s affiliations, loyalties and political sensibilities. Moreover, tran-
snational feminists frame their agendas not only in relation to nationally 
based gender-biased legislation (whether in their countries of origin or of 
residence), but also in relation to the transnational and transborder dynam-
ics that produce discrimination and contribute to wars and conflicts, as seen 
through the lens of transversal politics (Abdo and Lentin 2002; Cockburn 
1998; Yuval-Davis 1999).
Examples of feminists’ organisations include, among many others, the 
Mouvement des Femmes Algeriennes pour la Democratie, Nana Beurs, Al-
Masoom, Women Living under Muslim Laws, Women in Black and Women 
against Fundamentalism. These groups work to promote women’s rights and 
solidarities in European countries and also advocate for human rights, plural-
ism, women’s rights and the end of armed and domestic violence in the Middle 
East and beyond. These organisations often seek to support women in Europe 
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whose lives are entangled with global patriarchal oppression, on the one hand, 
and discrimination as a result of gendered immigration laws, on the other.
Moroccan Women in the Diaspora and the Reform  
of the Mudawwana
The year 2004 was marked by a salient event in the Maghreb: the reform of 
the Moroccan Personal Status Law, or Mudawwana, after more than 15 years 
of mobilisation by Moroccan feminists. The reform restricted polygamy, gave 
women access to more rights in the domain of child custody and divorce, and 
abolished the institution of women’s guardianship (wali). Although systematic 
studies have not yet been conducted on the role of the Moroccan diaspora 
in shaping political processes back home, there has been some evidence that 
mobilisation in favour of the reform of the law, which also revised the Family 
Code, took place in the diaspora among those first- and second-generation 
women who have managed to enter the European political arena at various 
local, national and European levels.1 
During an interview with a young French Moroccan activist who had 
campaigned for the reform, it emerged that diasporic women’s interest in the 
Moroccan Personal Status Law and its revision stems from intense transna-
tional ties with Morocco, either by way of frequent visits and/or by virtue 
of maintaining their Moroccan citizenship along with their European one. 
Moroccan women in the diaspora are thus involved in processes and practices 
of simultaneous incorporation at cultural, legal and symbolic levels (see Salih 
2003). They are aware of the importance of mobilising for their rights, both 
in Europe and in their country of origin, to which they remain tied. Develop-
ments in Morocco are seen as important, since the effects will have an impact 
on their lives in Europe. Within this framework, Moroccan women gave birth 
to a transnational public discussion through an initiative titled Moroccan 
Women from Morocco and Abroad. In September 2003, a conference in Casa-
blanca on the issue of the reform of the Mudawwana saw the participation of 
Moroccan women from Belgium, France, Holland, Switzerland, England, Cor-
sica, Canada, the United States, Germany and Spain, in addition to Morocco. 
The event was organised jointly with CIOFEM (Moroccan Women Informa-
tion and Observation Centre), an association working under the umbrella of 
LDDF (Democratic League for Women’s Rights). The conference outcomes 
emphasised the impasses that migrant women and men have to face as a result 
of the conflicts between the personal status codes of their country of origin 
and those of their country of residence.2
Recommendations from the conference included the proposal to apply the 
law of the domicile to all Moroccans residing abroad – following a decree that 
was approved in Spain in March 2003 – and the promotion of a campaign 
aimed at training diasporic Moroccans about women’s rights and duties in 
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mixed or same nationality marriages. The conference participants advocated 
setting up a network of Moroccan Women from Morocco and Abroad, which 
would coordinate mobilisation and information through action plans in each 
country, as well as at the regional and international levels.
The mobilisation of Moroccan women in the diaspora did not end with 
the reform of the Mudawwana. Indeed, they continued to discuss publicly the 
effects of the implementation (or lack thereof) of the reform on their daily life, 
encouraged to do so by the transnational dimension of their lives. For example, 
in Italy, despite its relatively brief history of immigration, it is not uncommon 
to attend public events promoted by associations of migrant and native women 
at which social, cultural and political predicaments are discussed through a 
transnational lens. 
An eloquent illustration of this was a public workshop on the effects of the 
reform of the Mudawwana on Moroccan women living in Italy and France, 
which took place in Turin in June 2006. The workshop was organised by the 
association Almaterra, a well-known ‘migrant and native women’s organisa-
tion’, which had been founded in the early 1990s, the first of its kind in Italy.3 
The purpose of the workshop was to present the results of research undertaken 
in the Piemonte region on the impact of the reform of the Moroccan Family 
Code on women in the diaspora and on the actual awareness among migrant 
women about the changes introduced by the reform. 
The workshop was also an example of interactions and exchanges between 
Moroccan activists and intellectuals in Italy and in Morocco that had been 
initiated by sociologist Fatima Mernissi and her itinerant think-tank, Karawan 
Civique. Founded at the beginning of the 1990s in Morocco, Karawan Civ-
ique was a forum for participation and discussion about Morocco’s legal and 
socio-economic development. It soon reached audiences beyond the borders, 
contributing to the development of a thick transnational networking between 
Moroccan women activists in Italy and in Morocco. In Turin, Moroccan activ-
ists and intercultural mediators – by virtue of their role as interfaces and facili-
tators between migrant women and the local social, health and legal services 
– had, over the years, been particularly concerned with raising awareness 
among Moroccan women about the reform of the Mudawwana and its effects 
on their lives and with enacting instruments to make the new Family Code 
fully operational in the diaspora. 
In this light, one of the first actions of Almaterra, which offers a full serv-
ice of intercultural mediators, was to promote a research project, ‘Rights in 
Movement: The New Moroccan Family Code in the Context of Migration’, in 
collaboration with the regional Commission for Equal Opportunities and a 
local research centre.4 The project was in fact initiated by a group of Moroccan 
and Italian women who had been interested in the cultural, legal and social 
changes occurring in Morocco and their impact on diasporic communities.
Almaterra itself could be seen as a launch pad for a transnational public 
sphere. Its board is composed of Italian feminists and ethnic minority women. 
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The centre administers several initiatives that include legal counselling, meas-
ures to promote women’s rights and cultures, activities to fund development 
projects in migrant women’s countries of origin and, finally, micro-credit 
strategies to valorise women’s talents and expertise and to promote economic 
empowerment. Operating at local, regional, national and transnational levels, 
Almaterra is committed to a feminist agenda that aims to cut across divides 
and empower women. 
The keynote speakers at the 2006 workshop were two young women of 
Moroccan origin, both attending the School for Advanced Studies in the Social 
Sciences (EHESS) in Paris and in the process of obtaining their PhDs on sub-
jects related to women and rights. Both were also involved in politics ‘back 
home’, one as a consultant for the government and for human rights organi-
sations in Morocco, and the other as the first diasporic woman to be elected 
as a member of the Moroccan Parliament.5 One of the two presentations was 
devoted to the results of the research project on the effects of the reform of 
the Moroccan Personal Status Law on migrant women. The other emphasised 
women’s achievements thanks to the reform, but also elaborated on the dis-
crimination that women face due to obstacles in implementing the reform. The 
presenter illustrated the particular predicament of women of Moroccan origin 
living in France, who often face several difficulties in matters related to mar-
riage, divorce and child custody as a consequence of the existing gap between 
French and Moroccan family codes (see Salih 2004). One speaker concluded 
by envisaging greater political power in Moroccan affairs for Moroccan nation-
als living abroad and by proposing what she called a ‘European code of Arab 
Muslim law’ for the Arab diasporas residing in Europe. An additional talk was 
delivered by the Almaterra lawyer who specialises in family codes, a front-line 
figure offering legal advice to migrant women in the association.
In the audience were sitting several young women of Moroccan origin who 
belonged to various organisations and associations operating at local, national 
and supra-national levels. Most of the women worked as intercultural media-
tors with Arab Muslim and migrant women in different towns in northern 
Italy. Two women in particular joined in the discussion, passionately contend-
ing that the reform of the Mudawwana was just a ‘cosmetic’ change addressed 
to the Western world that did not solve discrimination against women. One 
attendee speaking from the floor grieved over the situation of women ‘who 
have been suffering for more than eight years to get a divorce … These are 
women who often have met a new and real love in their life. Some have gone 
to live with Italian men with whom they also had children’. She concluded bit-
terly: ‘How are these children taken into account in the new Mudawwana?’ 
These and other examples (see Salih 2009) hint at how Moroccan women in 
the diaspora are becoming actors in a transnational civil society. As intercul-
tural mediators, as active members of women’s associations, as students and 
prominent figures of local, national and transnational organisations, as per-
sons actively involved in politics and reforms in their country of origin, these 
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women represent the essence of Fraser’s (2005) argument about the crisis of 
the nationally bounded conception of the public sphere. This change is taking 
place in a context where communities of fate, despite being deterritorialised, 
maintain a major interest in the political and cultural developments in their 
country of origin that directly affect their lives in the diaspora.
The Case of Kurdish Women in the Diaspora and Transnational 
Mobilisation: Troubles of a Borderless Entity
In this section, I examine Kurdish women’s transnational networks, which 
demonstrate the paradox of being a ‘borderless’ entity in a political context 
where not only identities but also resources and power are highly constrained 
by (inter)nationally based and/or nationalist conceptions. Kurdish women in 
the diaspora, by virtue of their non-state status and borderless identity, have 
been at the forefront of transnational feminist mobilisation.
Shahzad Mojab and Rachel Gorman (2007) have analysed the impact that 
women in the diaspora had on the state-building process of the Kurdish region 
of northern Iraq and how, in turn, politics within the Kurdish region has 
affected political agendas and mobilisation in and of the diaspora. Their analy-
ses are based on four different organisations located in Toronto, London and 
Stockholm, and on groups working in the Kurdish region in Iraq. The organi-
sations were chosen on the basis of their interest in addressing gender dis-
crimination and violence against women and because of their independence 
from Kurdish political parties. In their work, based also on their own personal 
involvement with Kurdish diasporic women, Mojab and Gorman emphasise 
the several challenges that the network had to face as a diasporic entity and 
also the ‘impact of the dispersed nationalism of a non-state nation on the life 
and struggle of Kurdish women in the diaspora’ (ibid.: 68).
Kurdish women have managed to create transnational networks, such as the 
International Kurdish Women’s Studies Network. In the autumn of 1996, this 
body was formed by a number of Kurdish and non-Kurdish women activists 
and academics, including Shahzad Mojab. The network, described as the first 
‘transnational Kurdish women’s organization’ (Mojab and Gorman 2007: 67), 
included Kurdish women and Kurdish women’s organisations active in Europe, 
North America and the Middle East across the various host lands, including 
Turkey, Iran and Iraqi Kurdistan. As the group’s web site recounts, the network 
‘started as a response to a growing need for opening a space for Kurdish women 
in international debates on women’s rights, women’s studies, and promoting 
gender justice among the Kurdish communities in the diaspora and the Middle 
East’6 (see also Mojab and Gorman 2007). The organisation ‘provides a forum 
for exchange of experience and knowledge among those who are interested in 
and work for improving the lives of Kurdish women; acts as a liaison for com-
munity-based, institution-based, academic and independent researchers and 
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activists in all parts of Kurdistan and in the diaspora; promotes the theories and 
practices of feminism among the women of Kurdistan and the diaspora; and 
promotes women’s rights and gender equality in Kurdistan’.7
Due to the many challenges it encountered, such as various official lan-
guages and dialects, differences in class and status, and contradictions between 
feminist and nationalist politics, the network faced enormous difficulties in 
establishing itself as a borderless transnational entity. Mojab and Gorman 
(2007: 68) report on the struggle to secure funding for the network’s activities, 
especially from the United Nations and other international agencies, such as 
UNIFEM (United Nations Development Fund for Women), which are inclined 
to support state-based women’s organisations that are anchored to a specific 
territory rather than diasporic ones. According to the authors, the non-state 
status of Kurdish women and their communities has constituted a major prob-
lem in raising funds. Moreover, Kurdish women in Europe were not able to 
receive funding allocated to ‘Third World-based’ women’s organisations, since 
they were listed as European residents.
Another challenge for Kurdish women in the diaspora is the indifference 
or sometimes the opposition of nationalist Kurdish political parties and asso-
ciations, both in the diaspora and in the Kurdish region (Mojab and Gorman 
2007), who view the development of a transnational feminist agenda with 
suspicion. The patriarchal attitude of Kurdish leaders in exile and the privilege 
given to the nationalist cause are among the major problems encountered by 
Kurdish women in the diaspora. As Mojab and Gorman (ibid.: 68) under-
line: ‘The network had to take a position against the patriarchal nationalism 
of Kurdish political parties and rely instead on its own efforts to establish 
transnational feminist solidarity.’ Women’s mobilisation in the diaspora may 
involve issues that include discrimination from host states as well as patriar-
chal communities. Living in the diaspora may thus subject them to the very 
painful experience of a double form of exclusion. In fact, by focusing on gen-
der or minority issues, they are often perceived as traitors who prioritise sec-
ondary causes over the nationalist agenda, or they are represented as being 
manipulated by Western powers.
The hegemonic constructions of the host nations impinge upon the forms 
and substance of diasporic women’s mobilisation. Kurdish women’s organisa-
tions in the diaspora mobilise and focus their agendas variably as feminist, 
nationalist or internationalist, depending on the way that they are perceived 
by the host country. Kurdish women in Turkey cannot mobilise as Kurdish, but 
they are allowed to organise as feminists. In Germany, Kurdish women often 
mobilise as migrant women because they cannot compete with mainstream 
male organisations, which monopolise most of the funding. These examples 
point to the unfeasibility of discarding the state and its hegemonic construc-
tions of identities to which minority women have to conform (Mojab and Gor-
man 2007). The role of the host state’s representations and the ways in which 
these shape the political action of Kurdish diasporic organisations have been 
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noted in other studies. Eva Østergaard-Nielsen (2002), for example, states that 
the political strategies of these organisations in Germany show an inward and 
an outward effect, simultaneously shaping home and host politics, depending 
on the opportunities that emerge in the local or domestic spaces where minor-
ities live. This, however, does not deny the transnational dimension of political 
lobbying activities. In her research on political lobbying among Kurds in Ger-
many, Fiona Adamson (2002: 167) highlights how Kurds are often involved in 
‘forms of political action from below that are neither strictly international nor 
domestic, but are rather characterised by political practices which take place 
within transnational spaces’.
Living in the diaspora can be advantageous in terms of providing women 
with the ability to disengage from conformist and dominant alliances and 
develop new political transversal positionalities. A woman activist interviewed 
by Mojab and Gorman (2007: 72) stated: ‘I think I am contributing and advo-
cating the plight of Kurdish women more effectively while I am abroad than 
being in Kurdistan. I am freer here. I do not need to be affiliated with any of 
the political parties. I have to admit that I am in the diaspora, but in my heart 
and head I live in Kurdistan every day. I want to know daily what is going on 
there and what Kurdish women have done. I am in love with Kurdistan and 
Kurdish women.’
Notwithstanding all these challenges, the work of diasporic women remained 
focused on gender issues, as witnessed by the campaign that was launched 
against honour killing following a series of murders of young women, both 
in the diaspora and in the Kurdish region. The transnational organisations 
Kurdish Women Rights Watch (KWRW) and particularly Kurdish Women 
Action Against Honour Killing (KWAHK), which has been active since 2000, 
were prominent in this regard. These groups, whose official aim is to support 
and promote women’s interests in Kurdish communities in both Kurdistan 
and the diaspora, and which therefore involve Kurdish women from different 
areas, campaigned and advocated for amendments to the Personal Status Law 
and honour killing legislation in the Kurdish region of northern Iraq.8 The 
transnational character of their mobilisation is reflected in this statement on 
the KWRW’s web site:
At present it is often difficult to assess the extent of violence against women, and 
honour-based violence is particularly likely to be concealed or misrepresented. We 
believe that it is crucial to build up a research base of evidence through reports in 
the Kurdish and non-Kurdish press. As we have members who speak Kurdish (Sor-
ani and Kurmanji), Arabic, Turkish and Farsi as well as English, we are coordinating 
the development of an archive of reports to provide information on women’s rights 
in general, and honour-based violence in particular, to be posted on the website as 
a permanent record.9
In the end, the efforts of these diasporic organisations and networks were per-
ceived and portrayed as downplaying the Kurdish government. As usual, women 
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were accused of emphasising or exacerbating the issue of honour killing, while 
shying away from nationalist agendas.
Despite these tensions, diasporic women managed to make an impact on 
politics back home, as witnessed by the fact that in 2005 the Kurdish regional 
government, led by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), appointed a femi-
nist based in Sweden, Mehabad Qaradaghi, as adviser for women’s affairs to 
Prime Minister Barzani. When asked how a diasporic woman, who had lived 
in exile for many years, could represent Kurdish women’s issues, Qaradaghi 
replied: ‘I have always worked for Kurdistan even if I have lived abroad. All my 
work is dedicated for the Kurdish community. Living in Sweden for 13 years 
has given me a different perspective in terms of writing, reading, and feminist 
work. Me and my experience will return to Kurdistan and as always I will be 
working in that line’ (Mojab and Gorman 2007: 76).
The experiences of the Kurdish diasporic women illustrate how the devel-
opment of transnational political subjectivities has to face the durability and 
reinvention of classic national and nationalist constructions, which, in both the 
host country and the homelands, may shape, hinder or limit the establishment 
of feminist transnational networks. Nonetheless, being located in the diaspora 
may provide women activists with a stronger awareness of the intersectional 
and multi-layered nature of their identities as women and furnish them with 
tools to diminish the nationalist pressure on their agendas.
Transnational Spaces: Empowerment or Disempowerment?  
The Case of Iranian Women
Other examples of women’s construction of a transnational public sphere are 
reported by Halleh Ghorashi and Nayereh Tavakoli (2006) in their work on 
Iranian women from the diaspora and from Iran (see also Ghorashi 2004). 
These authors are interested in the contested notion of identity within the tran-
snational framework and in the simultaneously enabling and limiting poten-
tials of transnational spaces for the women’s movement in Iran.
In the course of the 1990s, after more than a decade of enclosure and isola-
tion due to the politics of Ayatollah Khomeini, Iranian women gained access 
to transnational spaces. The new possibilities for Iranian women and activists 
came from the development of information and communication technologies, 
such as the Internet, and from a newly established connection with the Iranian 
diaspora after many years of reciprocal suspicion. During the 1980s, Iranian 
women in the diaspora who had left their homeland soon after the revolution 
were indeed very pessimistic about the country’s civil society, and they viewed 
Iranian women living in Iran as collaborators of the regime. On the other hand, 
women from inside Iran fought to gain rights within the constraining limits of 
the regime and managed to improve their situation, as witnessed by the pro-
liferation of women’s magazines and organisations and by the ever-increasing 
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number of women in universities and professions (Afshar 1998; Mir-Hosseini 
1999; Moallem 2005). Women activists in Iran could not or would not work 
within a secular framework; instead, they had to adapt and negotiate strategi-
cally within the discursive limits imposed by the Islamist leadership. They 
often defined themselves as Islamic feminists, in opposition to Iranian women 
in exile, who generally espoused the idea that women’s rights are human rights 
and cannot be achieved from within a religious framework.
Despite the reciprocal suspicious gazes, Iranian women from Iran and from 
the diaspora managed to create transnational spaces of mobilisation and dis-
cussion. One example is the Iranian Women’s Studies Foundation (IWSF), 
whose aim has been to ‘provide a forum for the exchange of ideas on issues 
related to Iranian women’ (Ghorashi and Tavakoli 2006: 95). The first meeting 
took place in 1990 in Cambridge and was followed by annual meetings held 
in different cities (Los Angeles, Berkeley, Denver, Paris, Stockholm, London, 
Berlin, among others), which are attended every year by Iranian women from 
all over the world. This transnational public sphere is not devoid of conflicts. 
Rather, every year the meeting is dominated by increasingly deep divergences 
between activists and scholars, on the one hand, and ‘secular’ and ‘Islamic’ 
feminists, on the other. 
The cleavages, which cross-cut the diaspora–non-diaspora divide, are 
concerned with different political cultures that no longer necessarily reflect 
geographical locations. For example, one point of contention arose between 
Iranian secular activists and feminist scholars living in the diaspora over the 
theorisation of Iranian women’s work in Iran in terms of Islamic feminism. 
These scholars have been accused of endorsing postmodernist and culturally 
relativist views and have been verbally attacked on more than one occasion. 
Similarly, leftist activists in the diaspora perceived women from Iran, who had 
been invited to attend the annual meetings, as supporters of the Islamist regime. 
Ghorashi and Tavakoli report that during the 2003 conference, when Mehran-
giz Kar, the lawyer and activist for women’s rights from Iran, was awarded the 
Woman of the Year prize, many attendees raised their voices in protest on the 
basis that a woman who is allowed to work as a lawyer in Iran cannot be trust-
worthy. These concerns created bitterness among other women activists, as one 
participant interviewed by Ghorashi and Tavakoli (ibid.: 96) states:
Those leftists were saying that Mehrangiz Kar is a betrayer, because she had been 
working with the regime. This is absurd. The only reason for their accusations is 
that she has been able to work as a lawyer in Iran and has had her own office. For 
those people, someone who had stayed in Iran, no matter what that person had 
been doing, whether that person had been in prison or not, had been raising her 
voice or not, simply the fact that the person had stayed in Iran is already the symbol 
of her/his betrayal.
The conflicts reached the highest level of tension during a conference that 
was held in Berlin in the year 2000. Leftist Iranian activists from the diaspora 
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interrupted the meeting in protest and prevented the speakers from interven-
ing. A woman and a man improvised a striptease as a form of protest against 
the Islamist regime. This incident, endlessly reported by the Iranian media, 
eventually led to the imprisonment of many scholars and activists upon their 
return to Iran. Accused by a Revolutionary Court in Tehran of having offended 
Islam and the Islamic Republic, some of them are still in prison. According to 
Ghorashi and Tavakoli (2006), this event, which resulted in many discussions 
and much reflection among activists in the Iranian diaspora, is paradigmatic of 
the contradictory impacts of transnational mobilisation on local activism back 
in Iran. The authors explain the interconnections as follows (ibid.: 97):
Transnational connections and incidents could be used by the state in order to limit 
the space for local activism. On the other hand, transnational allies have also proved 
essential for the support and safeguarding of civil society in Iran. Having access to 
the transnational space has been crucial for activists in Iran during the past decade. 
Transnational connections among Iranian NGOs and non-Iranian organizations 
and the organization of Beijing + 5 Women 2000 in Iran were sources of inspiration 
for local activism. Furthermore, the awarding of the Nobel Prize to Shirin Ebadi 
brought new self-confidence and self-esteem to Iranian women who had fought a 
twenty-five-year battle to claim their rights and their space.
Another means for enabling women is the increasing use of the Internet and 
blogs. These communication channels provide women in Iran with the ability 
to partake virtually in a transnational public sphere, breaking out of both the 
physical and intellectual isolation to which they have been confined by Islam-
ist conservatives. ‘Cyberspace has proven crucial in combining the local with 
the transnational. In fact, it is sometimes the only space that women living in 
Iran can escape to in order to express themselves freely, to collect information, 
to reach other, diasporic Iranians, and the rest of the world’ (Ghorashi and 
Tavakoli 2006: 99).
Problematising Transnational Feminist Networks: Towards the 
Dissolution of Old Asymmetries or the Creation of New Ones?
In the previous sections I have provided three examples of diasporic women’s 
transnational networks and have highlighted some of the main achievements 
and critical concerns emerging from these types of collective mobilisation. In 
this section I want to shift the focus to another type of transnational public 
sphere and discuss the ways in which asymmetries of power between women 
across the globe and categories such as South and North go through a double 
process of fragmentation and reinforcement in the context of the development 
of transnational partnerships.
One example is offered by Lilia Labidi (2007) in an essay on the crisis and 
challenges that the Tunisian feminist movement is undergoing in its shift from 
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a local and national movement to a transnationally oriented network. Labidi 
notes how the possibilities that emerged from the creation of partnerships with 
European women’s organisations and international donors have had a nega-
tive impact on the women’s movement for autonomy back home. Moreover, 
although the development of civil society networks and especially gendered 
networks and projects across the Mediterranean – namely, through the notion 
of partnership as promoted by the Barcelona process – was a crucial element in 
the achievement of women’s goals, it did not dissolve hierarchies. In fact, this 
mechanism reproduced old asymmetries and created new ones.
Two critical issues that accompanied this shift are raised by Labidi (2007). 
The first revolves around the extent to which ‘the establishment of a transna-
tional feminism is the product of internal struggles and/or the result of geo-
political pressures on the region’. The second issue is posed by the question, 
‘What lessons did they learn from their partnership with promoters of the 
Barcelona process which, while financing activities to advance women’s rights 
in the Mediterranean south, also support Schengen policies that restrict the 
movement of people from the South to the countries of the North?’ (ibid.: 8). 
It is true, Labidi underlines, that this shift is what allowed the feminist move-
ments in the region to achieve their main victories, for example, the reform of 
the Moroccan Mudawwana in 2004. Similarly, Tunisian President Ben Ali, in 
a speech delivered on the fiftieth anniversary of the enactment of the Personal 
Status Law, stated his country’s determination to support ‘all efforts on the 
regional and international level to propagate the values of equality, solidar-
ity, and modernity … to establish a solid basis for a broad Arab renaissance 
in which men and women share the same responsibilities on an equal basis’ 
(ibid.). However, these achievements came at a cost, exposing the movement 
to a new vulnerability, since in both Tunisia and Morocco women lost their 
independence from the state: ‘[R]eceiving from the state a guarantee that their 
rights would be protected, they in turn committed themselves to protect the 
institutions of the state’ (ibid.: 26).
Transnationalising the women’s movement also meant that feminists received 
substantial financial support from international donors such as the European 
Union, and this had serious implications. The crucial role of Morocco as a new 
buffer zone for Europe and the consequent efforts of the EU to weaken radi-
cal Islamist constituencies were some of the reasons why Moroccan feminists 
benefited from funding to advance their rights. In this context, the creation 
of a transnational feminist network obscured other hidden dynamics at work. 
Indeed, the women’s movement, by partaking in such a network, paid a high 
price in terms of political independence from the state. Also, as Labidi (2007: 26) 
explains, their participation in a transnational network paradoxically obscured 
or reproduced existing hierarchies of power across the globe:
[T]he reform of the Mudawwana, whose success was partly due to the use of modern 
communications technology, requires significant funds such as few poor countries 
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can afford. This raises the question of how poor women with scant rights might 
benefit from such support if they do not live in zones of strategic value to the 
wealthier countries of the North, which may provide support only in response to 
perceived threats, security or otherwise.
Concluding Remarks
Transnational feminist networks are seen as avenues through which women’s 
claims and struggles can widen their scope to reach broader audiences, as 
well as receive support beyond local or national borders (see Cohen and Rai 
2000; Moghadam 2005). A nationally bounded notion of the public sphere is 
subject to question when confronted with transnational practices, identities, 
mobilisation and spaces of communication engendered by diasporic political 
subjectivities. As Fraser (2005: 4) also notes: ‘The idea of a national citizenry 
which was supposed to be the subject of public sphere communication is today 
challenged by transnational identities, binational citizens, migration and iden-
tity politics, multiple residency schemes, flexible models of citizenship.’ In 
these circumstances, communication ‘can no longer serve its classic function 
of mobilizing those who constitute a “community of fate” to assert democratic 
control over the powers that determine the basic conditions of their lives’. Fra-
ser asserts that ‘not only do the powers reside elsewhere, but those affected by 
them do not constitute a political community’ (ibid.).
Classic notions of citizenship are being challenged by new, more intense 
transnational forms of political mobilisation and subjectivities. There is increas-
ing evidence that this mobilisation is being carried out not only by men, as the 
literature on long-distance nationalism has typically shown, but also by minor-
ity women, including women of Middle Eastern origin in Europe. As this arti-
cle demonstrates, Middle Eastern women in the diaspora, albeit from diverse 
political standpoints, contribute to the creation of public arenas for discussing 
the discrimination that women experience by taking into account the local, 
national and transnational scales that produce their legal, social and cultural 
conditions. In addition, women promote transnational public spheres aimed at 
discussing the conditions that sustain discrimination, the ways to change their 
life circumstances and the possibility of developing political objectives with 
the goal of challenging gender subordination.
The cases presented in this article emphasise the ability of transnational 
feminist networks to create a new language for women’s rights and to design 
shared priorities for women across boundaries that seem to have become less 
divisive in contemporary times. Moreover, the transnational dimension of 
women’s collective mobilisation, along with other transnational fields, reflects 
and is conducive to time-space compression at one and the same time. Tran-
snational networks provide women’s movements with more flexible and less 
bureaucratic organising structures, resulting in more effective campaigns that 
have a more immediate impact at local, national and supra-national levels.
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Transnational feminist networks are thus giving birth to a new vocabu-
lary, to more effective forms of organisation and mobilisation, and to glo-
balised campaigns that allow women to join forces despite and beyond their 
still meaningful differences (Moghadam 2005). The ability of individuals to 
create, join or reinforce advocacy work and campaigns beyond nation states is 
a major feature of transnational feminist networks and of transnational civil 
societies. For example, the Beijing Statement of 1995 was reached as a result 
to women’s transnational networks and campaigning. Supporting the idea of 
women’s rights as human rights and the notion of equality between genders as 
a prerequisite for development, the statement was seen as a critical reference 
point for women’s efforts to bring about economic development and the mod-
ernisation of family codes around the world.
However, this article takes issue with the celebratory lens through which 
networking and mobilising across borders are often perceived and represented. 
While recognising the surfacing of transnational civil societies and public 
spheres ‘from below’ and their potential to empower women, the article also 
points to the persistence or reinforcement of classic national boundaries and 
dividing lines between women across the globe, as well as to the paradoxical 
effects of certain forms of transnational partnerships ‘from above’, which end up 
weakening women’s movements (Jad 2007) or compromising their independ-
ence from national governments or supra-national institutions. For example, it 
has been noted how the transition towards a transnational form of feminism 
that seeks alliances with both international and regional feminist groups can 
stem from and reproduce asymmetries rather than simply overcome them, as 
was the case in the Moroccan and Tunisian contexts (Labidi 2007).
The Kurdish material provided another critical angle, illustrating the dialectic 
between national constructions – hampering political organisations and strate-
gies, and conditioning their access to political and symbolic resources – and the 
transnational sphere, and, in the Kurdish case, also borderless, political subjec-
tivities that strive to promote transnational and gender equality agendas in the 
public sphere. The Iranian case pointed to the difficulties in overcoming ideo-
logical divides and reciprocal mistrust between diasporic and non-diasporic 
women, but also to the paradoxical outcomes of technologies of communica-
tion, which can easily be used to strengthen control and hamper freedom of 
expression, as well as providing means of empowerment (cf. Mernissi 2005).
Ultimately, the article tries to show that the success of women’s transnational 
mobilisation rests upon its ability to involve women from the grass roots and to 
change everyday realities on the ground. This, in turn, depends on the potential 
of these networks to maintain the autonomy of women’s movements vis-à-vis 
the state, to produce equality of access to resources and to blur boundaries that 
are at one and the same time geographical, political and symbolic.
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Notes
 1. On the mobilisation of Moroccans in the Netherlands, see Buskens (2003: 105).
 2. See http://www.wluml.org/english/newsfulltxt.shtml?cmd%5B157%5D=x-157-20147 
(accessed 2009).
 3. See http://www.almaterratorino.org/ (accessed 2009).
 4. In 2007, the results of the research project were published in Turin by the Istituto Paralleli 
in a report titled ‘Dal Marocco all’Italia: L’applicazione della Mudawwana in Piemonte’.
 5. The statement of the diasporic member of Parliament, Nezha Elouafi, can be viewed at 
http://www.islamistica.com/nezha_elouafi/islam_e_musulmani_in_una_societa_laica_e_
pluralista.html (accessed 2009).
 6. See http://www.ww05.org/wows/member/kurdish.html (accessed 2009).
 7. Ibid.
 8. See Kurdish Women Rights Watch, http://www.kwrw.org/ (accessed 2009).
 9. See http://www.kwrw.org/wedo.html (accessed 2009). See also the web site for the Kurdish 
Women Action Against Honour Killing, http://www.kwahk.org/. 
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